Toward WTO 2000: a Seattle odyssey by Jeffrey J. Schott





rade ministers from the 135 member countries of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) reconvened
in Seattle in December 1999 to assess the operation
of the trading system and to initiate a comprehensive
new round of multilateral trade negotiations.  The meet-
ing ended in disarray and without action on the trade
agenda.  The new round is in abeyance, even though
new WTO negotiations on agriculture and services will
get underway in 2000 as preordained in the WTO’s
so-called “built-in” agenda.
Anti-WTO protesters claimed credit for disrupting
the Seattle meeting and blocking the launch of a new
trade round.  In large measure, however, the WTO
meeting fell victim to serious substantive differences
both among developed countries and between devel-
oped and developing countries regarding what should
be on the agenda for the new WTO Round.
In essence, everyone wanted to liberalize foreign
trade barriers, but not their own.  The major trading
nations were reluctant to address their own barriers
to trade in goods and services, while demanding that
new talks target protectionism in the developing world.
The developing countries argued that new concessions
should await the fulﬁllment of liberalization committed
during the previous Uruguay Round.  Some wanted
priority to be given to implementation of existing WTO
accords and “traditional” trade issues such as tariffs
and anti-dumping; others wanted the agenda broad-
ened to encompass new subjects like electronic
commerce and labor standards.  No one wanted
protracted talks like those which occurred in the
previous Uruguay Round, but no one seemed able
to craft a practical negotiating agenda that accom-
modated the diverse and often divergent interests
of developed and developing countries.
Some of the biggest problems, however, involved
disputes among the United States, European Union,
and Japan over farm subsidies, competition policy,
and anti-dumping.  The major trading nations did
not seem to have enough support from their domestic
constituencies to actively negotiate and put a deal
together.  In the United States, the ﬁve-year long
impasse over fast-track authority inhibited discussion
of possible U.S. trade reforms.  In Europe, monetary
union and enlargement issues already presage im-
portant economic and institutional reforms and made
countries reticent to undertake new trade obligations
that would entail additional adjustments, especially
in agriculture.
In brief, short-run political concerns now dom-
inate the trade debate and counsel caution.  Long-
run beneﬁts from prospective accords are simply
too far away to hit the radar screen of elected politi-
cians. Trade ofﬁcials will need to work hard to over-
come political resistance to new trade reforms, at
home and abroad, so that substantive negotiations
can proceed.
I cannot do justice in this paper to the com-
plexities of the problems that I have just outlined.
Their implications stretch well beyond the realm of
trade policy.  But, I can try to offer a few insights on
the value of international trade negotiations and
the particular importance of proceeding promptly
with a new WTO Round of multilateral trade talks.
To that end, this paper addresses why new negotia-
tions are needed, what needs to be included on the
negotiating agenda, what is in it for developed and
developing countries, and how the negotiations
should proceed.
WHY A NEW ROUND IS NEEDED NOW
In many respects, the launch of a new WTO Round
is now even more important in 2000 than it was in
Seattle, in part to remedy the substantive and institu-
tional problems exposed during the December meetings.
New global trade talks are needed for several reasons.
First, WTO talks would provide a useful buffer
against growing protectionist pressures in the United
States and Europe directed against increased imports
from emerging markets.  To date, we have not seen
signiﬁcant protectionist legislation in the United
States, despite a record U.S. merchandise trade
deﬁcit of almost $350 billion in 1999.  The one
notable exception has been the failed steel quota
bill.  However, there has been a growing resistance
to new trade initiatives, as evidenced by the contin-
uing impasse over the renewal of fast-track author-
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ity.1 As the U.S. economy slows and unemployment
increases from its current low levels, protectionist
demands are likely to proliferate.
In addition, aftershocks from the 1997-99 ﬁnan-
cial crisis continue to be felt in Latin America as well
as in Indonesia and Thailand, which have lagged the
Asian recovery.  The crisis has not provoked a sharp
increase in import restrictions in those countries, but
it has dampened political support–at least in the
near-term–for new trade reforms.  WTO talks are
needed to help get that reform process back on
track and to reinforce medium-term growth pros-
pects in those markets.
Second, public support for the WTO and an open
international trading system needs to be shored up.
In several major trading nations, the WTO is under
attack.  Public concerns about the effects of global-
ization (including expanded trade and investment)
on domestic production and employment, and on
national regulatory policies in areas such as labor
and the environment, threaten to undercut support
for new WTO initiatives in the United States and other
countries.  Some groups regard WTO provisions as
part of the problem (e.g., rulings against enforce-
ment provisions of U.S. environmental laws); other
groups want to refocus WTO obligations so that they
help meet other economic and social objectives (e.g.,
promoting human rights and higher labor standards),
even if the WTO is not the primary channel of action.
Governments will face increasing problems in sus-
taining political support for new trade talks if the trade-
related aspects of these issues are not addressed more
effectively in the WTO.
In that regard, the WTO’s free-trade principles
increasingly have been contested with respect to
products developed through new biotechnologies.
In particular, trade in genetically modiﬁed organ-
isms (GMOs) has raised concerns about the long-
term impact of these new products on human health
and the environment, and led several countries to
ban or segregate the sale of these products in their
markets.  The WTO requires that such restrictions
must be underpinned by sound scientiﬁc evidence
of potential harm, but WTO critics argue that by the
time the evidence is in, the harm will have been done.
Third, the implementation of the WTO’s dis-
pute settlement understanding (DSU) has exposed
a number of problems that need to be corrected.
For example, the recent banana and beef hormone
cases highlighted the ﬂaws in the compliance pro-
visions of the DSU; other dispute rulings (e.g., Fuji-
Kodak case regarding competition policy issues)
have pointed out other gaps in the trading rules.  The
dispute resolution system has to be ﬁxed to maintain
conﬁdence in the enforcement of WTO obligations,
and new negotiations are needed to remedy the notable
omissions and ambiguities in existing WTO provi-
sions that have been exposed by dispute cases.
Fourth, WTO members need to correct a few of
the WTO’s serious birth defects, particularly regard-
ing the management structure of the organization,
linkages with other international institutions, and the
transparency of WTO operations.  For example, the
WTO lacks a management or steering committee akin
to the Executive Board of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  The Quad (i.e., the
United States, the European Union, Japan, and Canada)
has assumed this role, but will have difﬁculty in main-
taining it as WTO membership expands to countries
such as China.  In addition, the ﬁnancial crisis has
underscored the need for closer cooperation between
the WTO and the IMF and World Bank to provide trade
expertise in the negotiation of reform packages and to
ensure that such reforms are maintained (via binding
in WTO schedules).2 New negotiations need to correct
these institutional problems in the WTO system.
Fifth, the WTO’s built-in agenda already man-
dates new negotiations by 2000 on both agriculture
and services, along with a number of other impor-
tant issues ranging from government procurement
to subsidies.  However, the built-in agenda is not
sufﬁcient to produce a successful trade accord and
will need to be supplemented if negotiations are 
to succeed.  Long-standing General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) experience demonstrates
that self-standing negotiations on agriculture never
succeed; recent services accords have fared some-
what better (but only when developing countries
accepted deals that did not require signiﬁcant changes
in U.S. and European practices).3 In short, a broader
bargain will be needed to allow countries to trade off
1 In addition, protectionist pressures weighed heavily in President
Clinton’s decision in April 1999 to reject the Chinese market access
proposal in its effort to join the WTO, and in Congressional adoption
of restrictive textile trade preferences for the Caribbean Basin and
Africa in May 2000.
2 Similarly, closer ties between the WTO and the International Labor
Organization could further understanding of how world trade can
help promote better working conditions and living standards in WTO
member countries. 
3 Since the end of the Uruguay Round, WTO members have concluded
accords on basic telecommunications and ﬁnancial services, and on
information technology products.  Talks failed on maritime services
and on the movement of natural persons.concessions across sectors and issues and undertake
obligations to liberalize long-standing and politically
sensitive trade barriers.  If the WTO does not under-
take a more comprehensive negotiation than that
set forth in the built-in agenda, the talks will likely
fail and, in so doing, also weaken credibility in the
multilateral negotiating process.
To address these problems, WTO members also
will have to redress the serious resource constraints
that already hamper WTO activities.  The Uruguay
Round accords greatly expanded the responsibilities
of the WTO but member countries have not provided
adequate resources to service new trade negotiations,
administer the burgeoning caseload of disputes, con-
duct trade policy reviews and complex accession
negotiations, and collaborate with the World Bank
and the IMF regarding trade reforms of countries in
ﬁnancial crisis.  Stafﬁng constraints already limit
the scope of cooperative efforts with the IMF and
the World Bank to help promote “greater coherence
in global economic policymaking.”  Such efforts
are particularly needed to assist the least developed
countries and countries in transition to fully inte-
grate into the world trading system.
WTO members need to allocate more funds and
perhaps additional authorities to the WTO’s Director
General and Secretariat to better handle these tasks.
The WTO budget is less than $80 million and has not
grown much since 1995, despite the enormous increase
in demand for services by the Secretariat and by pan-
elists and judges in the dispute settlement body.  At
a minimum, industrialized countries should imme-
diately double their WTO budget contributions (which
would mean an extra $12-14 million annually for the
United States).  There is no reason why some special-
ized United Nations (UN) agencies should receive
more funds than the world’s principal trade forum. 
Contributing to many of the problems cited above
are ongoing efforts to bring new members into the
world trade club. Increased membership will further
tax the WTO’s limited resources and exacerbate
management problems.  Before turning to the sub-
stance and process of prospective WTO talks, I will
divert brieﬂy to summarize a few key aspects of the
accession process that have a bearing on the WTO
negotiating agenda.
THE WTO ACCESSION PROCESS
To be a truly global system, the WTO should
strive for universal membership.  To date, progress
toward that goal has been good—but not good enough.
As of January 2000, the WTO has 135 members—
compared with 91 GATT signatories at the start of the
Uruguay Round.  In addition, 30 countries have applied
for membership and initiated the accession process.
The accession of new members to the WTO is not
as easy as it used to be under the GATT.  Candidate
countries face more comprehensive obligations cov-
ering both trade measures imposed at the border and
domestic policies that inﬂuence trade in goods and
services.  At the same time, special exceptions for
developing countries have been sharply cut back.
The entry bar has been elevated to record heights just
as the demand for WTO membership has increased
dramatically.
Negotiating the protocols of accession for prospec-
tive WTO members often is a long, tedious process (and,
in a few cases, highly politicized as well).  Countries seek-
ing WTO membership come from diverse backgrounds
and economic systems, and their accession protocols
must be tailored to their particular situation:
• Six countries are classiﬁed by the UN as
“least-developed.”
• Eleven countries are former components of
the Soviet Union, including Russia.
• Four countries are former Eastern European
components of the Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia and Macedonia.
• Three countries are relatively well-off Persian
Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman.
• Five others present diverse challenges: Algeria,
Andorra, Seychelles, Tonga, and Vietnam.
• Two are highly politicized: China and Taiwan.
In general, WTO members would like to expedite
the accession process of these countries, and to give
special terms for the poorest applicants.  However, the
trade regimes of the majority of the candidates do
not conform easily to the WTO system.
The basic choice confronting WTO members is
to approve entry for many of these countries on terms
that allow extended and ﬂexible implementation of
WTO obligations; or to hold back on entry as a lever
to induce the changes in national policies needed to
meet WTO standards.  Either way, new members should
adhere to all WTO obligations; the only difference is
whether they should be active members of the WTO—
and subject to WTO reporting and monitoring—while
they reform their policies.
Interestingly, 29 of the 135 WTO members are
classiﬁed by the UN as “least-developed” and pre-
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sumably least capable of implementing the com-
prehensive trade obligations, including the substan-
tial administrative and reporting requirements, of
the WTO accords.  Note, however, that some WTO
provisions explicitly exempt the least-developed
developing countries from speciﬁc obligations (such
as the ban on export subsidies).  The six least-devel-
oped countries currently seeking admission to the
WTO should be expected to do no more than these
current members.  To promote their accession, WTO
members need to offer greater technical assistance
to support efforts by applicants to adapt their trade
regimes to WTO norms and to guide their ofﬁcials
through the accession process.
THE NEGOTIATING AGENDA
To meet the challenges noted above, new WTO
negotiations will have to pursue several initiatives
simultaneously:
• Trade liberalization that contributes to the
sustained recovery from the recent ﬁnancial
crisis and blunts demand for new protection;
• New rule-making that establishes rights and
obligations in areas not yet subject to, or in-
adequately covered by, WTO provisions; and
• Institutional reforms that remedy ﬂaws in the
WTO’s dispute settlement and management
structure, that make WTO operations more
transparent, and that help promote economic
development for the betterment of all citizens
of WTO member countries.
Developed and developing countries will have
different interests in each of these areas and place
different priorities on liberalization versus rule-
making initiatives.  To take into account the broad
range of perspectives of WTO member countries,
the agenda for new WTO negotiations will have to
be comprehensive, addressing both the new issues
that pose problems for global commerce in goods
and services, as well as the systemic issues that
threaten to undercut public support for future
WTO initiatives.  The following subsections high-
light some of the key substantive issues that need
to be covered in new WTO talks.
The WTO Agenda: Existing Mandates
Agriculture and services are the twin pillars
of the WTO’s built-in agenda.  Oddly, that agenda
omitted tariff reform—the bread and butter of all
eight previous rounds of multilateral trade nego-
tiations.  Given historical precedent and the desire
of WTO members to continue to build on past ef-
forts in this area, I will also discuss tariff liberaliza-
tion as well as its alter ego, anti-dumping reform,
in this section.
Agriculture
The Uruguay Round accord provided one of the
few commitments to lower farm trade barriers, albeit
to a limited extent, in the post World War II period.
That multilateral negotiation succeeded because
negotiators could “ante up” a large array of foreign
concessions to “pay” for the liberalization of hard-core
farm trade barriers.  Recall that the Uruguay Round
pact on agriculture only succeeded when negotia-
tors linked commitments on intellectual property
and textiles to those on agriculture.
WTO members committed in the Uruguay Round
to restart negotiations by the year 2000 to promote
“progressive reductions” in agricultural support and
protection.  Each country has a different idea what
this means, but all generally support the liberaliza-
tion of other countries’ trade barriers and subsidies.
Reducing subsidies or import barriers protecting
domestic farmers will require, as it did in the Uruguay
Round, signiﬁcant trade-offs between agriculture,
manufacturing, and services reforms.
Not surprisingly, the agenda for agricultural reforms
is extensive.  The Uruguay Round barely scratched the
surface of trade barriers protecting national markets,
and the new negotiations will focus primarily on
building upon those tentative liberalization efforts.
Much work remains, in particular, to reduce subsidies,
lower tariffs, liberalize tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) and other
nontariff barriers.  In addition, WTO members will have
to decide how to handle the expiry in 2003 of the “peace
clause” that restrains many farm trade disputes.
Export subsidies remain a problem despite
signiﬁcant cutbacks agreed upon in the Uruguay
Round.  The Cairns Group and the United States
have proposed eliminating export subsidies.  To
temper such demands, the European Union has
argued that U.S. farm export credits should be
included under the existing disciplines.  Domestic
subsidies were also reduced in the last round, but
many countries argue that these disciplines are
being circumvented via ﬂexible interpretations of
“blue box” and “green box” exceptions (that is, sub-
sidies that are allowed because they are not linked
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to production or not deemed to be trade distorting).4
Tarifﬁcation in the Uruguay Round made some pro-
tection more transparent, but resulted in many
duties in triple digits; indeed, “dirty” tarifﬁcation
arguably raised some barriers to trade.  In addition,
in areas where countries made minimum access
commitments, improved guidelines are needed to
prevent countries from administering TRQs in a
manner that further limits access to their markets.
Finally, WTO members need to review the growing
number of non-tariff measures imposed in support
of national health and safety regulations to deter-
mine whether revisions are needed to the agree-
ment on agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, or possibly even a sui generis pact on
biotechnology.
At the same time, countries need to develop clear
and narrow guidelines for exceptions to liberalization
efforts in order to promote speciﬁc non-trade objec-
tives related to the “multifunctionality” of agriculture.
Many countries argue that they must sponsor some
level of agricultural activity to protect the environment,
promote biodiversity, enhance rural economic devel-
opment, and maintain food security.  In so doing,
however, WTO rules need to be crafted to guard
against the introduction of new non-tariff barriers
under the guise of broader non-trade objectives.
Services
The Uruguay Round developed a framework of
multilateral rights and obligations on trade in ser-
vices but left much work undone.  Recognizing the
limitations of their initial effort, WTO members
agreed in Article 19 of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) that new negotiations
would be launched by January 2000 to put more
ﬂesh on the skeletal provisions and commitments
previously negotiated.
The services negotiations are one of the most
critical components of the WTO agenda.  Services are
important both as stand-alone products and as critical
inputs for the production of a wide range of goods
and other services.  Improving productivity in service
sectors can thus yield extensive growth dividends
throughout member economies.  In that regard, these
talks are particularly important for developing coun-
tries to help them improve their ﬁnancial sector, and
telecommunications and transportation networks.5
Much of the attention of these negotiations will
focus on attempts to liberalize trade in particular
sectors, although the agenda also will be cluttered
by issues left over from the Uruguay Round (subsi-
dies, safeguards, and government procurement in
services) and by a number of important but intrac-
table constitutional problems (for example, the
relationship between the market access and national
treatment chapters).  Efforts need to be directed
toward building on the very limited liberalization
agreed in the basic telecommunications and ﬁnan-
cial services pacts, broadening reforms to new
sectors such as environmental, energy, and enter-
tainment services, and revisiting politically sensi-
tive areas, such as maritime and labor services. 
Unfortunately, negotiations on services will face
several critical problems.  First, unlike recent talks on
basic telecommunications and ﬁnancial services,
developed and developing countries will have different
export interests in the various sectors under negoti-
ation.  Developing countries place priority on removing
barriers in sectors where they are competitive, such
as labor and entertainment services; developed coun-
tries favor their own “winners” such as audio-visual,
air transport, information, and professional services.
“Priorities” of some countries are “non-starters” for
others.  Second, and more generally, the positive list
approach to scheduling commitments, along with
the ability of countries to limit the application of
those offers to one of the four modes of supply,
will continue to constrain the scope and value of
liberalization commitments.
Tariffs
Tariffs continue to be a mainstay of the WTO
agenda, despite notable success in prior rounds in
reducing levies imposed by industrial countries to
relatively low average levels.  Tariffs imposed by
developing countries remain generally high, although
the Uruguay Round made signiﬁcant progress in
binding a large share of those duties for the ﬁrst
time.  Several problems are left over from past
GATT efforts that should be addressed in the new
WTO round, including:
• “Peak” tariffs on selective products at levels 
4 For example, some countries argue that U.S. disaster relief programs,
that amounted to more than $6 billion in 1998, offset the subsidy cuts
mandated in the U.S. Freedom to Farm Act.
5 For example, to improve competitiveness of the tourism sector, coun-
tries need access to global telecommunications and information ser-
vices for marketing and reservations, and an efﬁcient transportation
network to get the people to the market.16 JULY/AUGUST 2000
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w ell above the average country tariffs, and the
related problem of tariff escalation.
• Tariff bindings at rates well above those cur-
rently applied that allow governments free
reign to raise duties for protectionist pur-
poses without WTO review.
To address these problems, countries traditionally
have developed a tariff-cutting formula to implement
tariff reductions across the board.  In practice, however,
such an approach quickly degenerates into a product-
by-product negotiation of exceptions to the so-called
“formula cuts,” which is why we still have a problem
with peak tariffs and tariff escalation.  The Uruguay
Round experience with “zero-for-zero,” sector-speciﬁc
tariff cuts suffered the same problem, as countries
carved out products or entire product categories
from the liberalization list.  To date, the United
States has proposed accelerated tariff liberalization
(really elimination) in eight sectors, but seeks to avoid
a formula approach to limit the exposure of its high
apparel tariffs to new tariff cuts.6 As a practical
matter, there is no real difference between the two
approaches since both will necessarily devolve into
intensive negotiations over exceptions to the general
approach on a product-by-product basis.
Anti-dumping
Trade remedy laws provide a safety valve for
countries that liberalize their trade barriers.  The WTO
allows its members to impose temporary import relief
(up to four years, with one four-year extension) if
imports threaten or cause serious injury to domestic
industry, and more lengthy and indeﬁnite (subject
to ﬁve-year reviews) protection if imports beneﬁt from
subsidies or are dumped and cause material injury.
Anti-dumping is one of the few legal ways for
countries to impose protection unilaterally (that is,
without WTO clearance), and it has become the
favored import relief measure for a growing number
of countries.  In the past, anti-dumping laws were
virtually the exclusive domain of the United States,
European Community, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand.  Since the end of the Uruguay Round, how-
ever, new users (primarily developing countries)
have accounted for many more cases than the ﬁve
traditional users.  Indeed, over the period 1993-1997,
Mexico and Argentina have reported almost as
many anti-dumping actions as the United States.
More than two-thirds of anti-dumping actions have
been directed against developing countries and
countries in transition during the 1990s, illustrating
why this is a priority concern for those countries.
Prospective WTO negotiations on anti-dumping
measures face an uncertain outlook. The Singapore
Ministerial in 1996 agreed to examine the “interac-
tion between trade and competition policy, including
anti-competitive practices”—which many countries
deﬁned as encompassing anti-dumping actions.
These countries hoped that U.S. interest in the latter
would allow consideration of constraints on anti-
dumping measures because those actions reduce
competition almost by deﬁnition (if one assumes that
the action is not directed against predatory practices,
as is almost never the case).  Instead, the linkage has
generated opposition by the United States to new
talks in both areas.  Incremental revisions to
existing provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement
are the most that could be expected from new talks;
too many countries value their recourse to these mea-
sures to stem “unfair” import competition.
Broadening the WTO Agenda
WTO member countries have put forward a
lengthy list of potential new subjects for negotia-
tions.  Several of the new issues actually date back
to the charter for the stillborn International Trade
Organization of the late 1940s, although they have
assumed added importance in a era of globaliza-
tion.  To a very modest extent, almost all are the
subject of WTO rules or ongoing working groups.
Many involve activities that go well beyond the
scope and competence of the WTO.  For that reason,
WTO initiatives in these areas must be narrowly
focused on the trade-related aspects of each issue
and have clearly deﬁned and pragmatic (i.e., achiev-
able) negotiating objectives.
Four topics have been frequently cited as candi-
dates for new WTO talks: investment, competition
policy, labor, and the environment.  In addition, elec-
tronic commerce has gained attention due to the rapid
growth in international transactions via the internet.
Investment
The Uruguay Round touched only lightly on
investment issues in the Agreement on Trade-
6The eight sectors, originally discussed in the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic
Cooperation forum, cover chemicals, forest products, medical equip-
ment and scientiﬁc instruments, environmental goods, energy, ﬁsh,
gems and jewelry, and toys.JULY/AUGUST 2000 17
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and in the
limited areas where countries undertook speciﬁc
commitments on “commercial presence” in the
GATS.  Many investment issues are not subject to
WTO disciplines; investment incentives and export
performance requirements, for example, continue
to distort trade and investment ﬂows among WTO
member countries. Given the recent experience in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) with negotiations on a “Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment,” and the heated
opposition that it generated among nongovern-
mental organizations, many countries are wary of
engaging in broad WTO negotiations in this area
(Graham, forthcoming 2000).  Instead, they would
like to continue the incremental approach to rule-
making within the existing WTO pacts.  The WTO
has three options for dealing with investment issues:
• First, WTO members could promote further
progress on breaking down investment barriers
by expanding the list of prohibited measures
in the TRIMs accord to include inter alia joint
venture and technology sharing requirements
as well as export performance requirements.
• Second, WTO negotiators could continue to
use the GATS talks to expand investment dis-
ciplines to a broader range of service activities.
• Third, WTO negotiators could craft a new
“Agreement on Direct Investment” that would
establish a common framework of rules for
goods and services.  Ideally, such an accord
would provide both most-favored nation and
national treatment to foreign investors (with
exceptions for national security and a few
other narrowly deﬁned sectors) as well as
disciplines on investment incentives.  In so
doing, a WTO investment pact would also re-
inforce the objectives of talks on competition
policy, since more open investment regimes
promote competition in the domestic market.
Given the importance of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) for the growth of key sectors in devel-
oping economies, these countries should champion
the cause of comprehensive investment rules in the
WTO (Moran 1998).  Most developing countries
already recognize the value of FDI in transferring
technology and management skills to their econ-
omies and have instituted investment reforms that
have substantially opened their markets to foreign
investors (with a few notable sectoral exceptions).
Competition Policy
At its core, the WTO is about competition policy
writ large.  Its aim is to create opportunities for ﬁrms
to trade and invest in foreign markets, adding a healthy
dose of competition for domestic producers.  National
practices differ, however, in their approach to what
constitutes a “healthy” level of competition, and
many countries do not have a body of competition
law at all.  Competition laws and regulations can
affect both the entry and distribution of goods and
services in a market by encouraging or discouraging
market concentration and restrictive business prac-
tices.  Makers of airplanes and telecommunications
equipment already know how such regulatory poli-
cies can foreclose export opportunities, but current
WTO provisions provide little recourse.
For these and other reasons, competition policy
poses complex problems for WTO negotiators.  Many
countries have difﬁculty in just crafting internal con-
sensus on trade and competition objectives; forging
an international consensus from differing national
legal structures and regulatory regimes will be even
harder.  For that reason, I am sympathetic to the
approach proposed by Graham and Richardson (1997),
who argue that WTO efforts in this area should be
handled in small, incremental steps.  The ﬁrst step
should be procedural, with an agreement that com-
petition-policy authorities would consult with their
counterparts in other WTO countries about practices
that impede the access of foreign investors or exporters.
Over time, closer contacts between trade and com-
petition ofﬁcials could produce more integrated poli-
cies, including the development of baseline common
standards (starting with cartels and mergers) that
could be codiﬁed in a new pact on trade-related
antitrust measures.
Nonetheless, the new WTO Round could make
progress on competition policy rules in narrowly
focused areas.  For example, the WTO already has
developed a set of regulatory guidelines that estab-
lish competition rules for the basic telecommuni-
cations sector.  As with investment issues, further
progress might be possible in speciﬁc service sectors
building on that precedent.
Environment
The WTO has been discussing environmental
issues since its inception under the auspices of the
Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE).
Unfortunately, the CTE has made little progress in
deﬁning an agenda for WTO negotiations.  Provisions
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r elating to environmental matters in GATT Article
XX, and the standards and the sanitary and phyto-
sanitary agreements are ambiguous and have pre-
cipitated several high-proﬁle disputes (e.g., tuna-
dolphin and shrimp-sea turtle cases).  Rulings in
these cases found that certain enforcement provi-
sions of environmental laws were in violation of
WTO obligations; ideally, the panels also should
have clariﬁed issues and areas of WTO law where
existing rules are inadequate and need to be sup-
plemented to deal with the problems under dispute.
What should be done?  First, the WTO agenda
in this area should develop procedures within the
CTE to examine the environmental implications of
existing and new WTO initiatives.  Second, countries
should negotiate reductions in subsidies that distort
trade and generate adverse effects on the environ-
ment.  For example, agricultural subsidies have
promoted overproduction in some regions with
adverse effects on soil and water resources.  Similar
concerns arise in the energy, forestry, and ﬁshery
sectors.  Third, sector-speciﬁc initiatives that promote
liberalization of environmental goods and services
should be given priority.  Finally, WTO talks should
revive the generally failed efforts of the CTE to for-
mulate WTO guidelines with respect to eco-labeling
and to promote the conformity of WTO rules with
multilateral environmental agreements.
Labor
Labor issues are highly contentious among WTO
members and also provoke vocal and substantive
concern among WTO critics.  The 1996 Singapore
Ministerial clearly rejected WTO negotiations on
labor issues, deferred to the International Labor
Organization (ILO) regarding the strengthening of
international labor standards and enforcement
mechanisms, but recommended that the two secre-
tariats continue their existing (albeit minimal) coop-
eration.  Since that time, WTO discussion of labor
standards has been consistently blocked by devel-
oping countries; in fact, the ILO has not even been
accorded observer status in the WTO (unlike several
other international agencies).  However, the ILO has
produced several notable agreements on labor stan-
dards, including the June 1999 Convention on the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.
All countries want their workers to enjoy higher
standards of living and cleaner and safer working
environments; few tolerate having other countries
impose trade sanctions because of their domestic
labor policies.  ILO members have agreed on a num-
ber of Conventions and “principles concerning the
fundamental rights which are the subject of those
Conventions,” and that these “universal rights” should
be promoted by all countries.  However, there is no
agreement on what steps countries should take to
implement and enforce those rights, much less wheth-
er different standards should apply in countries at
vastly different levels of development.
In brief, WTO countries do not have a common
view of what trade-distorting labor practices should
be subject to WTO obligations or how to determine
whether they exist in particular situations.  As a
result, WTO provisions provide no objective standard
by which dispute panels can judge the compliance
of national labor practices with WTO rights and
obligations (with the exception of GATT Article XX
provisions relating to prison labor).  No wonder
developing countries are reticent to discuss WTO en-
forcement measures against abusive labor practices.
The new WTO Round will probably not be able
to solve that complex problem, but it can promote
better understanding of potentially trade-distorting
labor practices and cooperative initiatives by the
WTO and the ILO to improve working conditions in
their member countries.  Given the residue of ill will
among many WTO members from previous U.S.
efforts in this area, new initiatives in this area would
have to start with a modest agenda.  As I have pre-
viously proposed (Schott 1998), the ﬁrst steps should
be procedural and aim to codify the nascent, in-
formal process evolving between the WTO and
ILO.  A joint committee of the WTO and ILO Secre-
tariats should be commissioned to examine both
the relevance of GATT provisions to labor issues and
what could be done in the WTO to promote higher
labor standards (both carrots and sticks).7 Reports
from this committee could then inform future dis-
cussions and negotiations in both organizations.
Electronic Commerce
The rapid growth in the virtually unregulated
domain of electronic commerce should command
the attention of WTO negotiators.  Here, a dose of
preventive medicine is in order.  At the May 1998
WTO Ministerial, member countries agreed not to
7 For example, WTO members could consider “green lighting” labor
training subsidies (i.e., exempting them from countervailing duties) to
facilitate adjustment and create new opportunities for trade in rela-
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impose tariffs on electronic commerce for one year.
This standstill agreement should be extended so that a
work program can be fully developed in both the GATT
and GATS context that addresses the real and potential
distortions to the “production, distribution, market-
ing, sale or delivery of goods and services by electronic
means” arising from domestic regulatory policies.
WHAT’S IN IT FOR THE
UNITED STATES?
The United States has been the leader of the post-
war world trading system and remains so today.  U.S.
ofﬁcials are at the center of efforts to develop an inter-
national consensus on the terms of reference for the
new WTO negotiations.  These efforts are hampered,
however, by sharp divisions within and between
U.S. political parties regarding the issues and objec-
tives that should be given priority in the WTO talks.
The ﬁve-year old impasse over fast-track authority
reﬂects these differences, and complicates efforts
to consolidate political support for U.S. requests and
offers in new negotiations.  Indeed, the United States
has not made signiﬁcant changes in its trade prac-
tices since the inception of the WTO, and is reticent
to discuss reductions in its remaining trade barriers
in the context of prospective WTO agreements.
As a practical matter, the United States will not
be able to “free ride” on the WTO Round as it did in
the recent services and information-technology pacts;
it will have to offer concessions if the talks are to
succeed.  Nonetheless, the United States has much
to gain from a successful package of WTO accords.
First, new WTO agreements would help secure
greater access to foreign markets for U.S. exports of
goods and services.  Overall, foreign trade barriers
are signiﬁcantly higher than those protecting the
U.S. market; like the Uruguay Round package, U.S.
trading partners will undertake much more extensive
liberalization commitments than the United States.
In particular, U.S. trading interests would beneﬁt
from reforms in the following areas:
• Industrial tariffs: Reducing foreign levies down
to U.S. levels and/or eliminating tariffs entirely
sector-by-sector (including the eight sectors in
Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) fo-
rum’s accelerated tariff liberalization proposal,
and an Information Technology Agreement  II).
• Agricultural reforms: Eliminating or sharply
reducing export subsidies; substantially reduc-
ing domestic subsidies and clarifying criteria
for blue and green box programs; cutting tariffs;
and strengthening disciplines on the adminis-
tration of tariff-rate quotas and operation of
state-trading enterprises.
• Services: Building on the modest liberalization
achieved in the Uruguay Round on a sector-
speciﬁc basis with a focus on both infrastruc-
ture and ﬁnancial services, and on new areas,
such as environmental services where U.S.
ﬁrms are world leaders.
• E-Commerce: Maintaining duty-free treat-
ment of electronic transmissions, and advanc-
ing a WTO “work program to ensure techno-
logical neutrality in the development of WTO
rules, and capacity-building efforts to ensure
that developing countries have access to the
Internet” (Esserman 1999, p. 6).
Second, WTO accords will hopefully promote
more effective compliance with WTO accords, and
improvements in the WTO system “to make the organ-
ization more transparent, responsive, and accessible
to citizens” (Esserman 1999).  Several WTO initia-
tives would work toward these goals, including:
• Strengthening the dispute-settlement under-
standing, particularly the compliance provisions.
• Improving the transparency of WTO opera-
tions, including the publication of documents
on a timely basis, increased inputs from inter-
ested parties in dispute settlement cases, and
better means for “stakeholder organizations”
to share their views with WTO delegations.
• Promoting transparency in national procure-
ment systems through adoption of WTO core
principles in this area.
Third, WTO accords help promote the adoption
of market-oriented reforms in countries negotiating
accession.  Strengthening the rights and obligations
of the trading system through new WTO accords
provides useful guidelines for future policy reform
in China and the other countries seeking admission
to the world trade club.
Fourth, to broaden public support in the United
States for overall WTO initiatives, the United States
would like to strengthen WTO initiatives dealing with
labor and environmental issues.  U.S. objectives in
these areas are modest compared with earlier pro-
posals, but still face strong opposition from devel-
oping countries.  On labor, the United States would
like to establish a forum for discussing trade and
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labor issues as part of a broader effort to promote
compliance with internationally recognized core
labor standards.  Environmental objectives are less
contentious since they build on existing provisions
and initiatives in the WTO, and seek to promote
environmental reviews of trade pacts as well as re-
form of trade practices (e.g., subsidies) that cause
environmental problems.
In sum, the United States has broad-based eco-
nomic and political interests in a successful WTO
Round.  Most of its objectives involve liberalizing
foreign trade barriers down to U.S. levels and strength-
ening WTO rules so that foreign trade laws and reg-
ulations move up toward U.S. norms.
What trade reforms can the United States con-
tribute to the party?  While the U.S. market is argu-
ably the most open in the world, there are a few
notable barriers whose partial liberalization could
yield large dividends both in terms of foreign trade
concessions and U.S. economic welfare.  U.S. nego-
tiators will probably be pressed to accept reforms
in three main areas: 
• Reductions in peak tariffs (including textiles
and clothing), perhaps capped at a level of 15
percent or below; 
• Reductions in agricultural protection, including
cuts in domestic subsidies and enlargement
of tariff-rate quotas on sugar, citrus and dairy
products; and 
• Constraints on the application of anti-
dumping duties.
WHAT’S IN IT FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES?
One of the main objectives of trade negotia-
tions over the past two decades has been to integrate
developing countries more fully into the world trad-
ing system.  For most of the GATT era, developing
countries were, to a large extent, “free riders” not
bound tightly to GATT disciplines.  The single under-
taking of the Uruguay Round substantially changed
this imbalance by requiring developing countries to
accept all the negotiated agreements, including those
containing provisions that would be difﬁcult to im-
plement in the prescribed time period (such as the
implementation and enforcement of intellectual
property laws and other regulatory policies).
Since the 1980s, developing countries have under-
taken much more substantial trade reforms, and
bound much of them in their WTO schedules, than
their trading partners in the developed world.  Since
their trade barriers remain, on average, higher than
those in North America, Europe, and Japan, the results
of new WTO negotiations will likely also require greater
liberalization by the developing countries.  From a
mercantilist perspective typical of past GATT rounds,
one could question the potential value of the new trade
pacts; but from a development perspective, these deals
have immense importance for developing countries.
Why then is it so important for developing
countries to participate actively in new WTO nego-
tiations?  The answer is not simple because there is
no monolithic position among the large number of
developing countries that participate in WTO talks.
Unlike the ﬁrst seven rounds of GATT negotiations,
developing countries now have widely differing
priorities and interests depending on their level of
development, on their obligations under regional
integration initiatives, and on their dependence
on trade in agriculture and commodities, manufac-
turing, or services.  Coalitions among developing
countries (such as the Caribbean Regional Negoti-
ating Mechanism and the G-15), and between groups
of developed and developing countries (e.g., the
“Friends of the Round”) now devise common posi-
tions that attempt to bridge the gap between devel-
oped and developing country interests.  Recogniz-
ing this diversity, let me nonetheless outline what
developing countries need from the new talks and
a few reasons why they may not ask for it.8
First, and most fundamental, developing coun-
tries gain from the strengthening of the rules-based
multilateral trading system.  As the weaker partners
in the trading system, they beneﬁt the most when
the major trading powers play by a common set of
rules.  In the Uruguay Round, for example, the will-
ingness of the United States and Europe to accept
dispute rulings and constrain their unilateral trade
actions provided a major beneﬁt for developing
countries.  The need to ensure compliance with
those rulings is, in turn, of critical importance for
the integrity of the WTO system.
Second, WTO negotiations help developing
countries undertake and “lock in” reforms needed
to advance their development objectives.  Ideally,
developing countries will implement trade and
other reforms unilaterally because it is good for
them; but, as a practical matter, most countries have
8 For a more extensive analysis of developing country interests in the
new WTO Round from somewhat different perspectives, see Krueger
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difﬁculty removing the “muscle” of protection (say,
the ﬁnal 10-percent tariff) without securing support
from other sectors of the economy that would gain
from negotiated trade reforms in other countries.
Simply put, reciprocal trade pacts (in the WTO and
among regional partners) are an important part of
the political economy of policy reform in develop-
ing countries.
Third, WTO accords could help advance agricultural
liberalization in the OECD area, especially in regard
to cuts in subsidies and high tariffs, that would be
difﬁcult to achieve outside the context of a large trade
bargain.  Of course, some developing countries would
like to maintain protection for speciﬁc products (e.g.,
Korean rice), and some would like to continue to import
subsidized goods that do not compete against local
production, but overall they would beneﬁt from in-
creased access to industrial markets for products such
as sugar, beef, and fruits and vegetables.  In several
instances, however, the greatest source of potential
growth in developing country exports would come in
areas of greatest import sensitivity in the OECD area.
Fourth, developing countries would gain from
cuts in peak tariffs in OECD countries, particularly
in the textiles and clothing sector.  Reductions in
textiles tariffs is particularly important in light of
the imminent demise of quotas in 2005, increased
competition from China after it accedes to the WTO,
and to dilute the value of preferences granted sup-
pliers under customs union and free-trade agree-
ments.  Here again, their demands confront strong
protectionist lobbies in the OECD area.  Moreover,
developing country demands in this area will spur
reciprocal requests that their tariffs either be reduced
or bound at the current applied rates.
Fifth, developing countries have much to gain
from new rules and liberalization in speciﬁc service
sectors.  In many countries, the development of
new service sectors, and strengthening the compet-
itiveness of existing industries (e.g., tourism), could
open important new growth areas and employ-
ment opportunities. For example, the growth of
E-Commerce could become a viable part of develop-
ment strategies if countries can improve their infra-
structure services, especially telecommunications.
Foreign investment in those sectors will be critical
in that regard; thus, developing countries also will
gain from WTO investment rules that would rein-
force the dramatic opening that has been achieved
in their markets over the past decade.  In addition,
labor services will be an important, albeit conten-
tious, topic for the new round.  Given immigration
concerns, however, such talks are unlikely to advance
unless WTO talks are narrowly focused by type of
worker and conditions of employment.
Sixth, developing countries would beneﬁt, like
everyone else, from reforms in anti-dumping rules
that constrain the overzealous use of these mea-
sures in a growing number of WTO countries.  As
the Uruguay Round demonstrated, however, reform
of the arcane and detailed regulations guiding the
administration of national anti-dumping laws is a
complex task that can yield perverse results.  Incre-
mental reforms offer better prospects for success;
small economies and the least-developed countries
would especially beneﬁt from the expansion of the
safe harbor provisions (e.g., de minimis thresholds)
for developing country exporters.
The above arguments present a strong case for
active participation by developing countries in the
new WTO Round.  In several areas, however, speciﬁc
export gains depend on the willingness of developed
countries to pare down long-entrenched barriers in
their least-competitive industries.  Many develop-
ing countries are skeptical based upon the experi-
ence with the implementation by OECD countries
of their Uruguay Round commitments, and the
failure of recent WTO negotiations on movement
of natural persons.  With some justiﬁcation, they
question whether key Uruguay Round reforms (e.g.,
elimination of apparel quotas), that were “back-end
loaded” and not scheduled to be fully implemented
until 2005, will actually be liberalized.  Conversely,
some developing countries worry that the liberal-
ization of those barriers will create new competition
for their exporters and actually reduce their market
share.  In addition, some developing countries are
less committed to anti-dumping reform because
they are new and extensive users, and have created
domestic interests that favor expanding this channel
for the provision of import relief.
Finally, developing countries will continue to
seek special arrangements in WTO accords to accom-
modate problems related to their development status.
The Uruguay Round accords pared back the scope
of such “special and differential” (S&D) provisions
that previously exempted poorer countries from key
GATT obligations.  Least-developed countries con-
tinue to receive large-scale and permanent exemp-
tions (e.g., from disciplines on subsidies); other
developing countries should not be given special
treatment.  Such provisions tend to distort invest-
ment within those economies and deter needed
policy reform and industrial adjustment.
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Instead, like all other WTO members, develop-
ing countries should accept common obligations,
but be afforded on a case-by-case, or sector or
product-speciﬁc, basis different transition periods
for the full implementation of those obligations
(just as developed countries were accorded 10 years
to phase out their textile quotas).  In other words,
“differentiated” treatment should apply only to
implementation periods to reﬂect, for example, the
particular needs of small economies.  This is particu-
larly important in some rule-making areas where
developing countries need to develop the adminis-
trative or judicial capabilities to implement and
enforce new trade disciplines.
THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
President Clinton, among others, has criticized the
long duration of past GATT rounds and suggested at
the GATT’s 50th anniversary meeting in Geneva in May
1998 that “we must develop an open global trading
system that moves as fast as the marketplace” (Clinton
1998).  He recognized that WTO talks must produce
concrete results in a timely fashion, or risk erosion
in the support of pro-trade coalitions for the trade
talks.  That is the rationale behind the call of U.S. Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky for a three-year
deadline for new WTO negotiations.
Unfortunately, many trade ofﬁcials still think of
new WTO talks in terms of a ﬁxed-length, one-shot
GATT round, even though they admit that the old
GATT approach no longer ﬁts the fast-paced world of
global commerce.  Instead, they should adopt a broad-
er, yet more pragmatic, strategy for trade negotiations.
Fortunately, the WTO has already upgraded the
GATT model; its new institutional framework accom-
modates continuous negotiations.  WTO ministers
can start and ﬁnish talks on some issues while other
subjects remain under debate and new issues are
added to the agenda.  Trade ministers could use their
regularly scheduled meetings as action-forcing events
to put together a package of trade agreements in
what I have called a “round-up” (see Schott 1998).
In this way, countries can conduct a series of seam-
less trade negotiations, with new talks starting imme-
diately after a package of trade agreements is con-
cluded.  Each round-up would build on the results
of the previous accord.  Over a decade, the WTO
could produce three or four round-ups, which
cumulatively liberalize signiﬁcant trade barriers
and strengthen member countries’ rights and
obligations.
To implement this strategy, WTO talks will have
to encompass a broad range of issues.  Some trade
officials worry that WTO talks will bog down if
negotiators cover too many issues, including sub-
jects that do not seem “ripe” for resolution in the
near future.  They fear that the requirement that
the new round be a “single undertaking”—in which
nothing is agreed until all aspects of the package of
accords are agreed–would make it quite difﬁcult to
conclude new trade pacts promptly because nego-
tiations in some areas will require many years to
be fully resolved.
Such concerns reﬂect an outdated concept of
“single undertaking” based on the old GATT model
of trade rounds.  Each set of agreements, or “round-
up,” would be a single undertaking, but would not
require that all aspects of all issues under negotia-
tion be completed before a deal could be concluded.
Because the WTO is a forum for continuing negoti-
ations, not all of the problems in a given sector
need to be rectiﬁed in the ﬁrst phase of talks or ini-
tial round-up, nor would each round-up have to
include all issues.  Each package, however, would
have to include reforms of interest to both developed
and developing countries, so that each member
could “bring home” concessions that reinforce
domestic political support for the trade pacts and
for implementing reforms of their own trade barriers.
To be sure, such an approach still requires com-
plicated “horse trading” among a large number of
countries on a large number of issues.  But crafting
together such packages of agreements, I believe,
is essential to accommodate trade-offs across sec-
tors and issues, involving both product or sector-
speciﬁc liberalization and acceptance of new trade
obligations.  Without such grand bargains (even on
the more limited scale envisioned by my round-ups),
WTO members will likely fail to dent the strongest
trade barriers protecting domestic industries in their
key export markets.  Nonetheless, the three-year
timetable for the talks, as proposed by the United
States and others, will clearly be ambitious, espe-
cially if the lack of fast track and electoral politics
in 2000 limit the ﬂexibility of U.S. negotiators to
pursue reciprocal trade pacts.
THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.
FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY
For the United States, each round-up would
require new implementing legislation that would
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with recent GATT rounds.  Round-ups will thus
increase the urgency of early reauthorization of
fast-track authority.
To be sure, U.S. ofﬁcials do not need fast-track
authority to enter into new trade negotiations.  Fast-
track is, in essence, a gentlemen’s agreement be-
tween the Congress and the Executive to expedite
the consideration of legislation implementing the
results of trade agreements in return for Congres-
sional approval of negotiating objectives and input
into the negotiating process.
In the past, U.S. ofﬁcials started trade negotia-
tions without fast-track authority, but with the explic-
it understanding that such procedures would be in
place well before the ﬁnal stages of the talks.  Today,
however, Congressional approval at a later date cannot
be assured.  To the contrary, fast-track legislation
has been defeated in the Congress and stands a low
probability of passage in the next few years.
The ﬁve-year-old impasse over fast-track has
two important implications for WTO talks.  First, it
raises questions about the depth of the U.S. polit-
ical commitment to new trade initiatives.  The
reluctance of the Clinton administration to defend
ongoing regional and multilateral trade initiatives
against the critics of globalization within their own
party in the run-up to the Presidential election in
November 2000 underscores such concerns.  Con-
tinuing differences among policymakers in both
parties over the priority to be given to labor and
environmental objectives in trade accords is part 
of this problem.
Second, it ties the hands of U.S. negotiators in
preparing the agenda for new trade talks and limits
prospects for multilateral accords.  Whether they
admit it or not, U.S. negotiators have been reticent
to offer proposals that require signiﬁcant changes
in U.S. practices, policies, and trade barriers, partic-
ularly in areas such as agriculture, textiles, and
anti-dumping and competition policy.  Without a
Congressional mandate, U.S. ofﬁcials fear that such
actions would galvanize widespread opposition to
fast track renewal from a diverse coalition of busi-
ness, labor, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).  Unfortunately, this posture makes it hard
for U.S. ofﬁcials to be responsive to the priority
objectives of other WTO members, particularly
developing countries.  Naturally, these countries
respond in kind:  Why expose one’s own sensitive
trade barriers to global talks if the major industrial
markets seem unlikely to offer concessions in areas
of greatest interest to them?
In short, U.S. trading partners interpret the im-
passe over fast-track as a sign of political opposition
to reform of U.S. trade barriers and conclude that
U.S. ofﬁcials want to “free ride” on the next WTO
trade accord.  Some countries, such as India, go
further and argue that these political constraints
signal a desire to renege on past commitments to
eliminate textile quotas (citing as evidence the
recent U.S.-China WTO accession talks).  Under
these circumstances, the task of building an inter-
national consensus on a WTO agenda becomes
increasingly difﬁcult.  Witness Seattle.
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